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I.

INTRODUCTION
As information becomes increasingly available in digital form, a
little noted yet significant legal change is occurring in the way in which
information providers use the law to establish the terms under which they
market their products. Electronic information providers, in contrast to
their hard-copy counterparts, have continually turned to the private law
of contract both to supplement and modify the public law of copyright.'
While this trend began when most users were relatively large commercial,
academic, or governmental enterprises, it accelerated as software
providers began to market pre-packaged software to consumers, using the

© 1997 Maureen O'Rourke.
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to David
Dana, I. Trotter Hardy, Keith Hylton, Rob Merges, participants in Digital Content: New
Products and New Business Models, a conference at the University of California, Berkeley,
Boalt Hall School of Law (1996), my research assistants, Jim Dowd and Aaron Moore, and
to the Boston University School of Law Library staff. This paper was presented at the
1997 American Law and Economics Association annual meeting.
1. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-1010 (1994).
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infamous "shrinkwrap" as a device to alter the copyright law through
private contract.2 This movement to contract has continued with the
proliferation of on-line data. In particular, it has extended to contracting
not just to modify copyright rights that would otherwise apply but also
to create private copyright protection through contract in instances in
which the public law would deny copyright protection altogether.
More specifically, since the Supreme Court's decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,3 compilers of facts have
faced considerable risk that their compilations will be considered outside
the scope of copyright protection because they lack originality.4 In the
absence of certainty that public copyright will protect such data-and
thereby allow recoupment of the investment made in gathering and
collating it-many providers of electronic databases have attempted to
create their own copyright protection through both standard form (i.e.,
shrinkwrap) and negotiated contracts.5 By endowing noncopyrightable
data with copyright-type protection, these contractual terms governed by

2. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Propertyand Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1241 & n. 5 (1996) (noting that shrinkwrap licenses had become part of commercial
practice by the early 1980s).
3. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding selection, coordination and arrangement of data
contained in an alphabetical white pages telephone listing to be insufficiently original to
qualify for copyright protection).
4. Note, however, that the Feist Court stopped well short of holding that factual
compilations are never copyrightable:
Factual compilations... may possess the requisite originality [for
copyright protection]. The compilation author typically chooses which
facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the
collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices
as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by
the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently
original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright
laws.
Id. at 348. There is an extensive literature discussing Feist. For a listing of just some of that
literature, see Paolo Cerina, The Originality Requirement in the Protection of Databases in
Europe and the United States, 24 HG: INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROPERTY & COPYRIGHT L. 579,
589 n.71 (1993). Whether the Feist decision has in fact made any practical difference as to
the copyrightability of such compilations is debatable. Prior to Feist, courts based
copyright protection for these compilations on the labor that was involved in creating them.
Now, they may accord that protection by stretching to find the originality required by Feist..
For a synopsis of the cases decided after Feist, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B][2], at 3-30 to 3-33 & n.76 (1996) (collecting cases and
contending tha tgenerally courts have been faithful to Feist but also citing a Second Circuit
case upholding the copyrightability of the Red Book listing of used cars).
5. See infra text accompanying note 18 (describing the contractual restriction involved
in the ProCD case); see also Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
Copnjright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479,
555 & n.313 (1995) (setting forth relevant terms of LEXIS and WESTLAW subscriber
agreements). Note that database providers did use contracts before Feist; providers have
always included contracts with their electronic products. The need for contracting became
more critical after Feist since contracts became the mechanism to replace the copyright
rights that Feist had withdrawn. Cf. id. at 487-93 (offering a rationale for the use of
contract even in cases in which copyright applies).
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state law seem to be preempted since they may function to negate the
federal copyright policy of promoting the free flow and use of factual
information. To date, academic commentary has largely treated the
contract formation and copyright preemption issues as discrete inquiries,
focusing separately on the issues of the enforceability of shrinkwrap
licenses6 and whether providers of copyrightable information may use
7
contract law to supplement or modify the rights which copyright grants.
It has had even less to say about the relationship between contract
formation and copyright preemption where private parties are attempting
to create their own copyright law by contract to protect information
8
which Congress does not protect under the Copyright Act ("Act").
This absence of academic commentary has become increasingly
glaring as courts have begun to address these questions. In particular,
ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg9 demonstrates not only the depth of the division
of opinion on these issues, but also the compelling policy arguments on
each side. In ProCD, the district court held that the shrinkwrap is not a
valid contract and, even if it were, its provisions which effectively confer
quasi-copyright rights on noncopyrightable data are preempted by the
Copyright Act." The Seventh Circuit reversed on both counts, holding
that a shrinkwrap license may be enforceable and parties may, in certain
circumstances, contract to treat noncopyrightable data as if it were
copyrighted without running afoul of the Act.1
Because this case is the first of its kind and yet addresses the
everyday practices of the database industry, it merits close attention.
This article discusses the case in detail, analyzing the contentions of both
courts. It then attempts to explain how the different decisions of the two

6. See Lemley, supra note 2, at n.107 (collecting authorities on the enforceability of
shrinkwrap licenses). Although the provisions of negotiated licenses are often similar to
those contained in shrinkwraps, this article, like the ProCD case, addresses only
shrinkwrap licenses.
7. This has begun to change as authors are beginning to discuss the relevance of
contract bargaining in the preemption inquiry. This commentary, however, is still at a
formative stage. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright,and Preemption in a Digital
World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995) <http://www.urich..edu/-jolt/vlil/hardy.html>;
Lernley, supra note 2; O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 479 & n.75 (arguing against preemption,
particularly where contracts are negotiated, as well as listing other authorities on the
subject); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 543, 610 (1992) (arguing that the bargaining process is irrelevant to the preemption
inquiry).
8. But see O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 555-57 (arguing that the preemption analysis
proposed therein to apply to copyrighted works could be extended to deal with
noncopyrightable works).
9. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'g 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996) [hereinafter
ProCD II].
10. See ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 659 (W.D. Wis. 1996) [hereinafter
ProCD I].
11. See ProCD I, 86 F.3d at 1449, 1454-55.
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courts reflect different understandings of the nature of copyright law. It
argues that the Seventh Circuit's decision reflects a flexible freedom of
contract approach to preemption which is fully appropriate given the
relative novelty of the technology and congressional silence regarding
preemption with respect to such technology. The article then discusses in
more detail two approaches to preemption-the Easterbrook model
which the Seventh Circuit used in the ProCD case and the default rules
model which draws on the academic literature regarding default rules. It
argues that a default rules approach may be preferable to the Easterbrook
model but would require some legislative action to implement. In the
interim, the Easterbrook model forms a reasonable basis from which to
assess claims that provisions restricting copyright rights should be
preempted.
II.

THE PROCD CASE-OF SHRINKWRAP LICENSES AND
PRIVATE COPYRIGHT LAW

In the ProCDcase, ProCD marketed a CD-ROM called Select Phone,
which contained a version of its database containing listings and
information from over 3,000 telephone directories, along with search and
retrieval software that facilitated the manipulation of that data. 2
ProCD marketed its product to both commercial and consumer 13 users,
charging the general public a much lower price than it charged the trade. 4
Defendant Zeidenberg purchased the consumer version of the product in
1994 and later purchased two additional packages containing updated
versions of the database. 5 The consumer version contained a shrinkwrap
license agreement 6 that was referenced on the outside of the product
packaging, encoded on the CD-ROM, reproduced in hard copy in the
manual accompanying the product and that appeared on the screen
whenever the user ran the software. 7 The license agreement contained a

12. See id. at 1449.
13. Of course, both commercial and non-commercial users of the product are literally
consumers." In this article, the term "consumers" refers to private, non-commercial users,
following the convention adopted by the 7th Circuit in the ProCDcase.
14. See ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1449 (noting also that ProCD adopted an intermediate
strategy of making its database available to the general public on America Online).
15. Id. at 1450.
16. "Shrinkwrap licenses take many forms. The prototypical example is a single piece
of paper.., wrapped in transparent plastic... Other examples of the genre include licenses
printed on the outside of boxes.., licenses simply included somewhere within the box.., or
licenses shrinkwrapped with the owner's manual accompanying the software." Lemley,
supra note 2, at 1241. In recent years, vendors have moved to "electronic shrinkwraps"licenses that appear on the screen and which the user allegedly accepts by continuing to use
the software. Thus, at this time, "shrinkwrap" might be more accurately defined as any
standard form-contract included with mass-marketed software, regardless of the manner in
which the purchaser is to be made aware of the license's existence.
17. See ProCD I, 86 F.3d at 1450.
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term limiting the use of both the copyrightable software and
Zeidenberg
noncopyrightable listings to non-commercial purposes. 8
violated the use restriction by making the noncopyrightable listings
available from his corporation (Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc.), for a
fee, via the Internet. 9 ProCD sued Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web
Services in Wisconsin federal district court, setting forth a number of
The court (and
causes of action, including breach of contract.2"
subsequently, the court of appeals as well) analyzed the breach of
contract claim as involving two interrelated inquiries: (i) whether the
shrinkwrap license was enforceable as a matter of contract law; and (ii) if
so, whether it was rendered unenforceable as preempted by the Copyright
Act.
A.

The Enforceability
Contract Law

of the

Shrinkwrap

License

Under

Conceptually, the issue of the enforceability of the shrinkwrap
license is divided into two questions: (i) whether, as a matter of contract
formation, a valid contract may be formed in the manner employed by
ProCD; and (ii) assuming such a contract may be formed, whether and
what terms of that contract should be enforced. However, the courts did
not bifurcate the issue in this manner. Instead, both courts presented one
An
inquiry into enforceability, arriving at opposite conclusions.
examination of the judicial reasoning of both courts suggests that the
ultimate holding of the court of appeals is that contracts may be formed
in the, manner employed by ProCD but both the formation process and
particular terms will remain subject to judicial scrutiny. An analysis of
both courts' reasoning demonstrates that this holding is both consistent
with the relevant law and desirable from a policy perspective.
THE DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
Both the district court and court of appeals
enforceability of the shrinkwrap under common-law
Wisconsin's implementation of Article 2 ("Sales") of
Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code"). According to the
1.

COURT AND
analyzed the
contract and
the Uniform
district court,

18. Id. at 1449. Note that the program was protected by copyright and that the database
was assumed not to be protected by copyright, even though 'it is more complex, contains
more information ...is organized differently, and therefore is more original than the single
alphabetical directory at issue in Feist." Id.
19. Id. at 1450.
20. See ProCD 1,908 F.Supp. at 644 ("Plaintiff contends that defendants' actions
constitute copyright infringement, breach of the express terms of the parties' software
license agreement, a violation of Wisconsin's Computer Crimes Act, misappropriation and
unfair competition.").
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Zeidenberg accepted the offer-and therefore formed a contract with
ProCD-at the time of sale, rather than when he began to use the product
after having the opportunity to become aware of the specific contractual
terms desired by ProCD.21 The district court contended that UCC
provisions stating that acceptance does not occur until the buyer has a
reasonable opportunity to inspect the product did not apply to the case
at hand, since inspection is intended to uncover product defects, not
additional written contractual terms that the seller desires.22
The district court, drawing on two of the three prior decisions
relating to shrinkwraps, 23 analyzed the facts under sections 2-207 and 2209 of the UCC. Section 2-207 is the "battle of the forms" provision. It
essentially modifies the common-law mirror-image rule by recognizing the
commercial reality that often the competing forms of the buyer and seller
contain conflicting or additional terms yet the parties still intend to
contract. 24 Section 2-207 contains detailed instructions on how to treat

21. ProCD1, 908 F. Supp. at 652 ("Defendants accepted plaintiff's offer to sell Select
Phone M ina reasonable manner at the nvniet they purchased the product by exchanging
money for the program... Paying for a software program is a reasonable manner of
accepting the offer implicit in the program's display on a store shelf.").
22. Id. ("Section 2-602 of the Wisconsin Code grants buyers receiving a tender or
delivery of goods an opportunity to inspect the goods before accepting. It guarantees that
buyers will not be saddled with goods that have been damaged or are otherwise
unsatisfactory upon arrival but it does not create a right to inspect additional written
contractual terms.").
23. The three decisions addressing issues involving shrinkwraps are: Step-Saver Data
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a standard form
disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies clauses contained on a shrinkwrap
license was unenforceable under U.C.C. § 2-207 as a material alteration); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a decompilation provision
in a shrinkwrap license sanctioned by a state statute was constitutionally preempted under
§ 117 of the Copyright Act.); and Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F.Supp.
759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding shrinkwrap terms enforceable in a transaction in which the
licensee opened the package with notice that such action would result in an enforceable
contract, but the contract was not enforceable in subsequent transactions in which such
notice was lacking). The district court placed primary reliance on the Step-Saver and
Arizona Retail cases, see ProCD I, 908 F.Supp. at 652-55, while the court of appeals
dismissed all three as irrelevant to the facts of ProCD.
As [the titles of all three cases] suggest, these are not consumer transactions.
Step-Saver is a battle-of-the-forms case, in which the parties exchange
incompatible forms and a court must decide which prevails. Our case has
only one form; U.C.C. § 2-207 is irrelevant. Vault holds that Louisiana's
special shrinkwrap-license statute is preempted by federal law, a question
to which we return. And Arizona Retail Systems did not reach the question,
because the court found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before
purchasing the software.
ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452 (citations omitted).
24. See 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-207:02 (1992)
(recognizing that "[s]ection 2-207(1) repudiates the umnn law principle, sometimes
known as the 'mirror image rule,' that a response to an offer constitutes an acceptance only
if it 'complies exactly with the requirements of the offer, omitting nothing from the promise
or performance requested."'); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules,
Standards,and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 122023 (1982) (recognizing the conventional wisdom that "[t]he drafters of 2-207 had the
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additional terms appearing in the competing forms. In contracts between
merchants,25 the additional terms become part of the contract unless they
materially alter it, the offer expressly limits acceptance to its terms, or
notification of objection to the additional terms is given in a timely
manner.2 6 However, the Code does not clearly address what to do with
additional terms when one party is a non-merchant like Zeidenberg. The
literal text of the Code seems to indicate that a contract may be formed
with the additional terms to be separately accepted or rejected.27
According to the court:
Keeping in mind the legislative goal behind § 2-207, it is
improbable to think that the drafters wanted consumers to be held
to additional proposed terms in situations in which merchants were
given protection... [A]pplying § 2-207 to the consumer transaction
in this case.., leads to the conclusion that the user agreement was
not binding on defendants because they never agreed to it expressly
28
and it never became part of the agreement between the parties.
Hence, one can infer that the court considered the contractual use
restriction a material alteration to the contract formed at the point of
sale.2 9
The court also considered whether the shrinkwrap might be viewed
as an enforceable modification to the contract formed at the point of sale.
Under § 2-209, while modifications to a contract do not require

salutary, indeed the unexceptional purpose of overcoming the rigidity of one of the oldest
and most mechanical common-law rules of offer and acceptance-the mirror-image rule,"
but arguing that the principles underlying the rule remain fundamentally sound); Daniel A.
Levin & Ellen Blumberg Rubert, Beyond U.C.C. Section 2-207: Should Professor Murray's
Proposed Revision be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & CoM. 175, 175-84 (1992) (examining the
resolution of the mirror-image rule and battle of the forms/last shot problems both before
and after the adoption of § 2-207).
25. Different parts of Article 2 draw on different facets of the definition of merchant set
forth in § 2-104(1).
"For purposes of [§ 2-207] almost every person in business would... be deemed to be a
'merchant' under the language [of § 2-104(1) stating that a merchant means a person]
'who... by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices... involved in the transaction... since the practices involved in the transaction
are non-specialized business practices .. U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 1 (1996).
26. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1996).
27. Under § 2-207(1), an acceptance may still be effective even though it contains terms
additional to those offered. See 1.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1996). "The additional terms are to be
construed as proposals for addition to the contract." Id. at § 2-207(2) (1996).
28. ProCD 1,908 F. Supp. at 655.
29. The court had earlier stated that it was improbable that consumers would be held to
terms from which merchants would be given protection. See id. Therefore, one could infer
that the court meant that even a merchant would be given protection from the use restriction
under § 2-207(2) had such merchant stood in the shoes of Zeidenberg. Under § 2-207(2), the
term would not become part of the contract if Zeidenberg objected to it, the offer limited
acceptance to its terms, or the term materially altered the contract. Since there is no
evidence that Zeidenberg objected to the use restriction or that the offer limited acceptance
to its terms, one can infer that the court meant that the use restriction was a material
alteration. This would be consistent with the holding in Step-Saver. See supra note 23.
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consideration to be binding, the parties still must agree to the
modification.3" The court stated:
Section 2-209 requires the express assent of a party to any proposed
contractual modifications. Assent cannot be inferred from a party's
conduct in continuing with an agreement. In this case, defendants
did not assent expressly to the terms of the user agreement. Their
continued use of the Select Phone TM product has no bearing on
Under these
whether they accepted the user agreement.
of the user
circumstances, § 2-209 does not warrant the incorporation
31
agreement into the parties' initial sales agreement.
The district court stated in its holding:
I conclude that because defendants did not have the opportunity to
bargain or to object to the proposed user agreement or even review i t
before purchase and they did not assent to the terms explicitly
after they 32learned of them, they are not bound by the user
agreement.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge
Easterbrook, informed its statutory analysis with reference to economic
considerations and practical realities. From a statutory perspective, the
court of appeals simply disagreed with the district court's reliance on § 2207 and its reading of the UCC as not permitting "money now, terms
later" contracts. 33 The court stated that § 2-207 does not apply in cases
involving only one form and went on to note that § 2-204(1) of the Code
permits contracts to be formed in any manner including conduct. 34 It
stated that ProCD as "master of the offer" was free both to "invite
acceptance by conduct, and [to] propose limitations on the kind of
conduct that constitutes acceptance." 35 In the case at issue, Pr6CD
offered a contract to be accepted by the buyer's use of the software 'after
36
the buyer had an opportunity to review the offered contractual terms.
Zeidenberg's continued use of the software after becoming aware of the
terms constituted his acceptance.3 7

30. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1996) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this article
needs no consideration to be binding."); see infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text
(discussing § 2-209).
31. ProCD 1,908 F. Supp. at 655 (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. ProCD11, 86 F.3d at 1451-52 (enumerating a number of common "pay now, get terms
later" transactions at odds with the district court's contention, which the court of appeals
characterized as follows: "According to the district court, the U.C.C. does not countenance
the sequence of money now terms later.").
34. See id. at 1452; see also U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1996) ("A contract for sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.").
35. ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452.
36. See id.
37. Id.
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Unlike the district court, the court of appeals drew support for its
holding by analogy to § 2-606, which defines "acceptance of goods."38
Under § 2-606(1)(b), a buyer may be deemed to have accepted where it
fails to make an effective rejection, but such acceptance does not occur
until the buyer has had a "reasonable opportunity to inspect [the
goods]." 39 While § 2-606 deals with acceptance of goods and does not
expressly mention acceptance of an offer, the court saw § 2-606 as
further evidence of the UCC's flexibility in allowing the parties to arrange
their affairs in such a manner "that the buyer has a chance to make a final
decision after a detailed review."40

Unlike the district court, the court of appeals discussed at length
the policy implications of holding boilerplate contracts unenforceable. Its
focus thus seemed to be more systemic than that of the district col rt, as it
was concerned with the impact of its decision not merely on the
immediate parties, but on all similarly situated parties.4 1 For example, it
stressed that transaction costs may be saved through the use of standard
forms4 2 and that, in "real life," buyers often pay for a good or service
before the detailed terms are even communicated to them.43 In the
consumer context, it emphasized the everyday transaction of purchasing
boxed goods.44 Warranty disclaimers that states routinely enforce are
often inside such boxes." Likewise, when a consumer purchases drugs

.38. Id.
39. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(a) (1996).
40. ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1453; see also infra notes 61-63, and accompanying text
(reviewing Code goals, including flexibility).
41.. See id. ("[Aidjusting terms in buyers' favor might help Matthew Zeidenberg today
(he already has the software) but would lead to a response, such as a higher price, that
might make consumers as a whole worse off.").
42. "Standardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as
standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass production
and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions
rather than the details of individual transactions." Id. at 1451 (citing RESTATEMENT 2D OF
CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981)).
43. Id. ("Transactions in which the exchange of money precedes the communication of
detailed terms are common"; citing the purchase of insurance, airline tickets, and concert
seats as examples of such arrangements).
44. See id.
45. Id. ("[S]o far as we are aware no state disregards warranties furnished with
consumer products."); see also Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 708 F.Supp. 708,
710-11 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that a warranty disclaimer appearing not on the outside of
the box but in bold type on a booklet attached to containers of herbicide within the box, did
not fail of its essentia purpose, nor work in an unconscionable fashion, and therefore was
enforceable under Pennsylvania commercial law). But see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-5, 427 & n. 22 (4th ed. 1995) (noting that
warranty disclaimers which the buyer finds only after the delivery of the goods are
disfavored and should be construed as modifications to the contract and citing Gaha v.
Taylor-Johnson Dodge, Inc., 53 Or. App. 471, 632 P.2d 483 (1981) (holding a disclaimer of
warranty appearing in a booklet delivered two weeks after purchase to be ineffective)).
Since its decision in ProCD, the Seventh Circuit has upheld an arbitration clause on a set of
terms enclosed in a box, citing ProCD for support. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
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the consumer is charged with reading the accompanying
over the counter,
46
package insert.
The court of appeals also considered the nature of the software
industry, acknowledging that the shrinkwrap is routinely used. The court
suggested the conclusion that while academia has doubts about its
enforceability, business does not. 47 Moreover, the court emphasized the
mischief that the district court's decision could work in stifling the
burgeoning software distribution mechanisms of mail-order and on-line
sales. 48 Particularly in on-line transactions, the customer never sees a box
but instead receives an electronic file which contains the relevant terms
and conditions.4 9 As the court stated in an intuitive economic analysis:
On Zeidenberg's arguments, these unboxed sales are unfettered by
terms-so the seller has made a broad warranty and must pay
consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance, two
"promises" that if taken seriously would drive prices through the
50
ceiling or return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age.
The court of appeals also argued for contract enforceability from a
more sophisticated economic approach. As it noted, ProCD engaged in
price discrimination, charging consumer buyers less than commercial
users.5 1 If ProCD could not engage in such price discrimination-i.e., it
had to charge all users the same amount-it would eventually have to
Fewer
raise the price to both consumers and commercial users.5 2
users
commercial
while
consumers would be able to purchase the product,
might have to pay more to make up the revenue shortfall caused by lost
53
consumer sales.
For price discrimination to succeed, ProCD had to find a way to
prevent consumers from defeating its strategy by reselling the product to
commercial users for less than what ProCD would charge such users. In
the words of the court of appeals, "[t]o make price discrimination

1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997).
46. See ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1451.
47. Id. at 1452.
48. Id. at 1451-52.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1449 ("ProCD decided to engag in price discrimination, selling its
database to the general public for personal use at a low price (approximately $150 for the
set of five discs) while selling information to the trade for a higher price.").
52. Id. ("If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single
price--that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than to the general public-it
would have to raise the price substantially over $150.").
53. Id. If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer segment of the market the
only way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to commercial users alone, then
all consumers would lose out-and so would the commercial clients, who would have to
pay more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution toward costs
rom the consumer market.
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work... the seller must be able to control arbitrage."5 4 This control is
particularly difficult for software vendors as they cannot easily
distinguish between consumer and commercial purchasers in a gardenvariety retail transaction in which a customer walks into the store, picks
the software up from the shelf, and purchases it.55 ProCD could have
chosen to offer different products in an effort to force users to sort
Instead, they
themselves into consumer and commercial segments.
marketed one product, using the license to limit use of the program to
non-commercial purposes.5 6 To hold the license unenforceable would
essentially force ProCD either to raise its price or to change the way it
packaged its product.
Based on these economic considerations, the court of appeals held
the shrinkwrap to be an enforceable contract. However, it stopped short
of a blanket statement that all terms of all shrinkwraps would be
enforceable, stating that "[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless
their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general
(for example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they are
unconscionable) .""
2.
AN EVALUATION OF THE COMPETING VIEWS
The court of appeals' decision upholding the enforceability of
shrinkwrap licenses is likely to be considered both remarkable and
disturbing by academia. The weight of academic commentary prior to
ProCD argued primarily for a refusal to enforce such agreements or at
least parts thereof for diverse reasons.5 8 Judicial authority in this area
has been quite scant and has yielded no clear cut answer. 59 However,
Professor Lemley characterizes the precedent that does exist as reflecting
a "general refusal of... United States courts to enforce shrinkwrap
licenses" which brings U.S. law into harmony with that of the many other
countries that do not enforce shrinkwrap licenses or do so only with

54. ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1450.
55. Id. ("Anyone can walk into a retail store and buy a box. Consumers do not wear
tags saying 'commercial user' or 'consumer user."'); see also O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 499
(contending that one reason software providers include standard form contracts with
provisions against decompilation is to account for their inability to distinguish among
types of users).
56. ProCDII, 86 F.3d at 1450 ("Instead of tinkering with the product and letting users
sort themselves-for example, furnishing current data at a high price that would be
attractive only to commercial customers, and two-year-old data at a low price-ProCD
turned to the institution of contract.").
57. Id. at 1449.
58. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 1263-64 n.107 (collecting authorities discussing the
issue).
59. See supra note 23 (describing the cases addressing shrinkwrap licensing prior to
ProCD).
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restrictions. 60
The court of appeals' decision then seems truly
revolutionary, flying in the face of academic thought and, to a lesser
extent, the views of other courts.
However, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the court's
decision is eminently supportable. While it is tempting to avoid the
federal copyright preemption issue by holding either the shrinkwrap itself
(or certain of its terms) unenforceable, there is nothing in the UCC which
precludes its enforcement. More importantly, both the UCC's policy and
provisions provide ample support to argue both for allowing contracts to
be formed in the manner used by ProCD and for enforcing the provisions
of such contracts.
Any UCC analysis of both contract formation and enforcement
should be anchored in a firm understanding of the Code's overall
statutory goals, as well as those contained specifically in Article 2. The
Code's overall philosophy is reflected in § 1-102(2) which states:
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;

61
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
In the context of Article 2, the UCC's drafters sought to decrease
contracting costs by adopting legal rules that recognized commercial
reality and de-emphasized the formalities of common-law contract.6 2
Further, Article 2 is based on the belief that law can be and in fact is
revealed by what parties actually do.6 3 Thus, Article 2 often looks to
commercial practice in defining the legal rule.6 4 Moreover, the UCC, in

60. Lemley, supra note 2, at 1253.
61. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1996).

62. See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing § 2-207 which rejected the
common law mirror-image rule in order to accommodate commercial reality).
63. The Code-particularly Article 2-is often described as being based on Karl
Llewellyn's legal realist philosophy. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 302-40 (1973) (discussing the jurisprudence of the U.C.C. and the role
Karl Llewellyn and his legal realist philosophy played in developing it); Richard Danzig,
A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN L: REV. 621
(1975). But see William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5 (1967) ("Ican also state that what
Professor Llewellyn believed should be the articles of an ideal commercial code were not
the articles as they emerged from the crucible of debate when the Code was promulgated.").
In Llewellyn's own words, "Iam ashamed of [the U.C.C.] in some ways; there are so many
pieces that I could make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that
would have been good for the law, but I was voted down." Karl Llewellyn, Why a
Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953). However, out of all of the Articles in
the Code, Article 2 probably best reflects Llewellyn's philosophy. See Peter A. Alces, The
Revision of Article I of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1299, 1299
(1994) ("Quite simply, Article 2 of the U.C.C., 'Sales,' is, more than any other article of the
Code, Llewellyn's LIaw. ") (citation omitted).
64. See Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American
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implementing its drafters' belief in freedom of contract, seeks to decrease
65
costs by employing legal rules that give effect to the parties' agreement.
Thus, the statutory orientation of Article 2 is one in which the parties are
given maximum flexibility to draft their own agreement which a court
should generally enforce.66
Any particular dispute must be interpreted under the literal wording
of the Code placed against this perceived intent. In the case of the
67
shrinkwrap license, such an interpretation argues for its enforceability.
Simply put, holding the shrinkwrap enforceable based on the economic
considerations which Judge Easterbrook identified illustrates the very
flexibility in accommodating commercial reality that the drafters designed
the Code to achieve.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court of appeals has the
better argument in asserting that § 2-207 is not the governing provision.

Codifications, and their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent Development,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1170 (noting that the U.C.C. "bid[s] the legalists to make contextspecific inquiries to infer the rules implicit in each situation.") (citation omitted). For
example, the Code modifies the parol evidence rule by permitting evidence of usage of trade,
course of dealing and course of performance to explain or supplement even a fully
integrated agreement. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1996). Thus, an agreement is interpreted against the
backdrop of shared assumptions inherent in a particular industry. See ALAN SCHWARTZ &
ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS-PRINCPLES AND POLICIES 63-64 (2d ed. 1991)
(noting that the result of including trade usage as a source of contractual meaning may be to
decrease negotiation costs because parties are not required to memorialize crnnon
practices).
65. See Rosen, supra note 64, at' 1222-23 (contending that Article 2 is based on an
"Agreement" theory aimed toward ensuring enforcement of the parties' agreement); see also
U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1996) ("Subsection (3) [of § 1-102] states affirmatively at the outset
that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code ... ").
66. The U.C.C. does contain some mandatory rules as well as vague admonitions that
serve to limit the parties' flexibility. See SCHWARTZ & Scott, supra note 64, at 4 (noting that
Code rules can be classified as belonging to one or more of 4 categories-directives, risk
allocations, enabling provisions, and vague admonitions). For example, § 2-201 is a
mandatory rule providing that a contract for the sale of goods of $500 or more must be
evidenced by a writing to be enforceable. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1996). See also U.C.C. § 1-102(3)
(1996) ("The effect ofprovisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement....");
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1996) (granting courts broad discretion to reform unconscionable contracts
or clauses).
67. Today's U.C.C. does not explicitly address shrinkwrap licensing. However, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Law
Institute are currently drafting a new Article-Article 2B-for addition to the Code.
Proposed Article 2B is still under discussion; it is not currently a part of the U.C.C., nor has
it been adopted by any state. Article 2B would cover licensing transactions such as that
entered into by ProCD and Zeidenberg. At least one of its drafts contains a provision that
would sanction shrinkwraps like ProCD's. Both courts addressed this provision. The
district court characterized it as "evidence that the American Law Institute views current
law as insufficient to guarantee the enforcement of standard form contracts such as
shrinkwrap licenses." ProCD 1,908 F. Supp. at 655. However, the Seventh Circuit argued
that the district court's conclusion regarding the proposal "depends on a faulty premise.
To propose a change in a law's text is not necessarily to propose a change in the law's
effect. New words may be designed to fortify the current rule with a more precise text that
curtails uncertainty." ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452.
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Section 2-207 governs narrow situations in which the parties have either
exchanged conflicting forms or discussed the transaction with one sending
a confirmation adding terms which had not previously been considered.68
The shrinkwrap transaction does not fit this paradigm. The very point
that some critics argue should render the shrinkwrap unenforceable-its
unbargained-for nature 69-serves to remove it from the ambit of § 2-207
since § 2-207 contemplates some type of communication between the
parties.
Further, even if one adopts the district court's view that the contract
is formed at the time of payment, the conclusion that the shrinkwrap is
an unenforceable modification under § 2-209 is not compelled. The
district court went beyond the statutory wording in asserting that a
modification requires the express assent of the party whom it is to bind
Section 2-209 requires an
and cannot be inferred by conduct.70 71
"agreement" for an effective modification.
Under § 1-201(3), an
agreement is "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language
or by implication from other circumstances induding course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance." 72 According to § 1-201's
Official Comments, "As used in this Act the word ['agreement'] is
intended to include full recognition of usage of trade, course of dealing,

68. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1996).
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is
the written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally
or by informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one
or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far
as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed. The other situation is offer
and acceptance, in which a wire or letter expressed and intended as an
acceptance.., adds further minor suggestions or proposals.
Id.
69. For articles discussing the pro's and con's of shrinkwraps, see Page M. Kaufman,
The Enforceability of State Shrink-Wrap License Statutes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 222 (1988); see also David A. Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses
and the Battle-of-the-Forms, 5 SOFTWARE L.J., 401, 406-12 (1992) (discussing the validity of
shrinkwrap contracts in light of U.C.C. Article 2); Karen Puhala, Note, The Protection of
Computer Software Through Shrink-Wrap Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1985)
(identifying issues associated with shrinkwraps, including the likely inability of vendors
unilaterally to impose terms on a user after completion of the sale but contending that
shrinkwraps are enforceable when the user is able to read the license prior to purchase);
Michael G. Ryan, Note, Offers Users Can't Refuse: Shrink-wrap License Agreements as
Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105 (1989) (arguing for the
enforceability of shrinkwraps but noting objections to them including the failure of the
bargaining model to fit classical notions of contract); Michael Schwarz, Note, Tear-MeOpen Software License Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Perspective on an
Innovative Contract of Adhesion, 7 COMPUTER/L. J. 261 (1986) (discussing the problem of
identifying when offer and acceptance occur with respect to shrinkwraps and assessing the
enforceability of particular terms).
70. See ProCD 1, 908 F. Supp. at 655.
71. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1996).
72. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1996).
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course of performance
and the surrounding circumstances as effective
73
parts thereof.

Under the Code's wording then, a modification may be inferred
from conduct.7 4 If one accepts the district court's view that the contract
is formed at the time of purchase, then the original terms consist of the
rights which the Copyright Act would grant 75 plus the UCC's gap-filling
provisions.76 The shrinkwrap terms would be considered a modification
to which the purchaser may "agree" through his conduct in continuing to
use the product after being put on notice of the relevant terms.77
In the ProCD case, usage of trade supports contracting in the
manner that the parties employed, 7 as well as enforcing the particular

73. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) cmt. 3 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Morrison v. Devore Trucking, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 2d 140, 143, 428 N.E.2d
438, 441 (1980) ("Subsequent acts and agreements may modify the terms of a contract.");
Wolpert v. Foster,312 Minn. 526, 254 N.W.2d 348 (1977) (holding that a court may find an
agreement to modify a written contract in the offeree's conduct); see also J.W. Goodliffe &
Son v. Odzer, 283 Pa. Super. 148, 423 A.2d 1032 (1980) (holding conduct may constitute a
waiver of a term requiring a modification to be in writing); Bone Int'l , Inc. v. Johnson, 74
N.C. App. 703, 329 S.E. 2d 714 (1985) (holding a post-sale agreement to be an oral
modification); WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 1-6, at 30.
75. Under the Copyright Act, the purchaser of a copyrighted work is subject to the
-exclusive rights of the copyright owner as detailed in § 106. The exclusive rights of the
copyright owner include the right to reproduce the copyrighted work and prepare
derivative works from it. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). These exclusive rights are, however,
limited in time (generally life of the author plus fifty years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994)) and
subject to other limiting doctrines such as the fair use (17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)) and first sale
doctrines (17 U.S.C. § 109) (1994)).
76. Under the Code, "[e]ven though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1996). For
example, the Code will fill in an open price term (U.C.C. § 2-305 (1996)), and/or an open
delivery term (U.C.C. §§2-307 to 2-309 (1996)).
77. But see James T. Peys, Note, Commercial Law--The Enforceability of Computer "BoxTop" License Agreements Under the U.C.C., 7 WHrnrIER L. REV. 881 (1985) (reviewing
U.C.C. law on modifications and concluding that shrinkwraps are not enforceable
modifications); Puhala, supra note 69, at 1373-76 ("[A] user's opening of the separate
diskette package and use of the software is unlikely to indicate the user's acceptance of the
modified terms... because the user usually does not intend to accept the modified terms by
his ordinary act of using the software.").
78. U.C.C. § 2-202 makes clear that usage of trade may be used to interpret a contract
already formed. "Terms ...may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of dealing or
usage of trade.., or by course of performance." U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1996). Less clear is
whether that usage of trade may also inform the question of whether a contract has been
formed. The expansive definition of usage of trade, see infra text accompanying note 79,
supports the argument that it should be used to help put the Code's rules on offer and
acceptance into the context of the relevant industry. See also Ore & Chem. Corp. v. Howard
Butcher Trading Corp., 455 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding usage of trade relevant in
determining the content of an offer and whether acceptance had occurred); Avery Katz, The
Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract
Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 220-21 (1990) (citations omitted):
Beyond the necessarily general language of black-letter formulations,
American contract law also allows contracting parties considerable leeway
to choose the form of their agreement in practice. This is especially so for
contracts governed by Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code, which in
large part reflects the view of Llewellyn and his colleagues that commercial
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terms contained in the shrinkwrap. Simply put, "Everybody does it."
More technically, "A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question."7 9 It is common practice in the software industry
to contract in the manner which ProCD adopted, as well as to employ the
terms which it did. This method of contracting facilitates a mass market
that might otherwise not exist by saving the transaction costs of face-toface bargaining. The particular terms help the provider recoup its
investment while not forcing it to charge an exorbitant price.
Of course, merely because "everybody does it" does not make it
right. The Code's willingness to incorporate trade practices is based on
an economic argument. The drafters assumed that commercial parties
would not long persist in an inefficient practice.8 0 The mere fact that a
trade practice is time-tested is evidence that it is "efficient" and therefore
desirable from an economic perspective.
This contention is less persuasive in cases in which one party is a
consumer-buyer who does not bargain with the seller. In such situations,
the seller, in the interest of maximizing its own gain from contracting, may
foist inefficient terms off on the buyer on a "take it or leave it" basis. For
this reason, the Code contains an array of safety valves to help guarantee
that buyers are not bound by onerous terms.
For example, the relevant usage of trade binds only those who
should be aware of it.81 This, however, may not assist the consumer. The
shrinkwrap has been so pervasive for so many years that even A novice
buyer should probably be aware of the usage of trade. Still, even if the
usage of trade is binding, § 2-302 provides for court reformation of
unconscionable contracts. 82 This section, though, is also unlikely to assist
law should be grounded in the expectations of the community of traders.
Aside from its variety of specific provisions referring to trade usage, course
of dealing, course of performance, good faith, and commercial
reasonableness, Article II directs courts generally to defer to private usage
in adjudicating formation issues.
But see Wichita Sheet Metal Supp!y, Inc. v. Dahlstrom & Ferrell Constr. Co., 246 Kan. 557,
565, 792 P.2d 1043, 1049 (1990) ('Clearly, usage of trade is limited to explaining language
used in an existing contract or filling in some gap in the contract. It cannot be used to create
a contract where none previously existed.").
79. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1996).
80. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1803 & n.128 (1996)
(explaining the rationale for Code reliance on trade usage and questioning the advisability
of this practice).
81. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1996) ("A course of dealing between parties and any usage of
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.").
82. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1996) ("Unconscionable Contract or Clause"); see also U.C.C. § 1205 cmt. 6 (1996) ("The policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts and
clauses.. . applies to implicit clauses which rest on usage of trade and carries forward the
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the consumer since, as the court of appeals noted, the use restriction was
reasonable under the circumstances. 3
The court of appeals' analysis concerning the time of contract
formation is equally, if not more, persuasive than the argument that the
shrinkwrap constitutes an enforceable contractual modification. The
Code, in effectuating its goal of flexibility, encourages the parties to
arrange their contractual relations as they see fit. The rules of offer and
acceptance as set forth by the Code are not rigid but rather are subject to
contrary agreement of the parties. The method employed by ProCD-an
offer to be accepted by the user's continued use of the software-is
reasonable and, as discussed above, reflects the relevant usage of trade.
Additionally,, there is a tenable argument that § 2-606(1)(b), which
provides for inspection prior to acceptance of goods, offers direct rather
than merely tangential support for the Seventh Circuit's holding. As the
court noted, "[t]erms of use are no less a part of 'the product' than are
the size of the database and the speed with which the software compiles
listings."8 4 The user therefore should have a right to inspect those terms
before accepting the goods. Section 2-606(1)(b) affords that right.
Nothing in the Code states that acceptance of an offer cannot occur
simultaneously with acceptance of the goods.
From a systemic perspective then, the UCC seems to support the
enforcement of a shrinkwrap as a valid method of contracting. Again,
this conclusion is relatively neutral with respect to the enforcement of
particular terms of the contract.8" Neither court was completely clear on
this distinction. Upholding the shrinkwrap as a valid method of
contracting seems desirable from a policy perspective and consistent with
decisions in other contexts upholding contracts which the buyer discovers
after purchase. However, merely stating that the shrinkwrap is a valid
contract in the abstract says little or nothing about whether particular
provisions would be enforceable. For example, a reasonable choice of law
provision would probably be enforceable 86 while a clause limiting time for
complaints might be set aside in the case of a latent defect.8 7 The
relevant questions are: (i) as a general matter, how does the law decide

olcy underlyin the ancient requirement that a custom or usage must be 'reasonable."');
.C.C. § 1-203 (1996) ("Every contract or duty within th[e] Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
83. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91 (discussing unconscionability in more
detail).
84. ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1453.
85. Of course, the more defective the formation process, the more likely particular terms
will be unenforceable.
86. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding the
enforceability of a forum-selection clause in a boilerplate contract).
87. See Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73
P.2d 1272, 1275 (1937); U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (collecting unconscionability cases).
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which contractual clauses should be enforced and which should not; and
(ii) where on that spectrum of enforceability does the ProCD use
limitation fit?
Under UCC § 2-302, the courts can use unconscionability as the
primary mechanism to police contractual terms. Section 2-302 grants a
court broad discretion in deciding whether or not, and how, to enforce a
contract that contains an unconscionable clause. Unfortunately, it offers
little guidance to courts on how to make the threshold determination of
whether a particular clause is unconscionable. 88 According to the Official
Comments, "The principle is one of oppression and unfair
surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power." 89 The question then often reduces to an
assessment of what the buyer's expectations were under all the facts and
circumstances. 9 Unfortunately, this inquiry is inherently speculative. To
inject some certainty, courts have often attempted objectively to
determine what the reasonable expectations of the buyer would be given
the relevant market. 91
The market factors which the Seventh Circuit considered in
upholding the contract itself and the use restriction it contained are
applicable in the unconscionability assessment. The court emphasized
the fact that the use restriction was reasonable under the circumstancesprice discrimination between commercial and consumer users allowing the
seller to market the product at a lower price. In other words, the court
implied that for the price the buyer paid, the buyer should have expected
the use restriction and therefore should be held to it despite the fact that,
as a practical matter, it may never have read the license agreement.
The importance of this market inquiry cannot be overemphasized.
The UCC is based on an economic rationale and clearly contemplates the
introduction of relevant market evidence in Code cases. Thus, the market
inquiry in the context of contract formation is obviously an appropriate

88. See generally Peys, supra note 77, at 908-10 (discussing the malleability of the
unconscionability inquiry).
89. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1(1996).
90. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 448-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(interpreting unconscionability under § 2-302 of the Code to require primary concern with
the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing at contract
formation); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 387-88, 161 A.2d 69, 85-86
(1960) (discussing the pre-Code equitable doctrines used to avoid unconscionable results in
the enforcement of standardized commercial contracts); WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, §
4-5, at 137 ("It is not possible to define unconscionability. It is not a concept, but a
determination to be macre in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula.").
91. The cases finding unconscionability based on excessive price offer support for this
proposition. They seem to be based on the courts' intuitive belief that the buyer did not get
the benefit of its bargain-i.e., the buyer expected or should have expected more for the
price which it paid. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 4-5, at 140-45 (discussing
various excessive price cases).
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one for a court to make. That market inquiry suggests that the use
restriction should be upheld as a matter of contract law. However, just
as stating that the shrinkwrap is an enforceable contract says little or
nothing about the enforceability of particular provisions, using market
evidence to uphold a particular provision as a matter of contract law
says little or nothing9 2 about whether that provision should be upheld as
a matter of federal copyright law.
B.

The Enforceability of the Use Restriction Under Federal
Copyright Law
The issue of whether the use restriction was unenforceable as
preempted by the Copyright Act would have been rendered moot if the
shrinkwrap were held unenforceable as a matter of contract law.
However, the district court, which did in fact hold the agreement
unenforceable, still commented on copyright preemption. 93 In contrast,
the court of appeals had no choice but to face the preemption issue since
it held the shrinkwrap enforceable, reversing the contractual holding of
the district court.
In the ProCDcase, the conflict between federal copyright policy and
state enforcement of a private contract is easy to perceive. This conflict
arises because of the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.9 4 The Court in Feist held that the particular
compilation of data in the white pages directory at issue was not
copyrightable. 9
Enforcement of the contract in ProCD seems rather
obviously to be at odds with this holding as it gives copyright rights to
noncopyrightable data. Thus, a review of Feist is helpful in framing the
issue prior to discussing the respective courts' preemption holdings in
ProCD.

92. This statement depends in large part on one's perception of copyright's purpose.
For example, adherents of the freedom of contract principle would say that if a provision is
enforceable under contract law, it is not to be preempted by the Copyright Act. See infra
notes 132-34 and accompanying text (contending that a freedom of contract perspective
views copyright as a boilerplate contract which the parties are free to contract around;
thus if a provision is enforceable under contract law, it is not preempted by the Copyright
Act).
93. ProCD 1, 908 F. Supp. at 644, ("I conclude... [diefendants never assented to the
license agreement included in the Select PhoneTM user guide and are not bound by it. Even
if defendants had assented, the license agreement is preempted by federal copyright law to
the extent plaintiff intended it to appry to uncopyrightable data."). While the court's
discussion of the preemption issue is arguably dicta since it was not necessary to the
disposition of the case once the court had held the shrinkwrap unenforceable, the court of
appeals characterized the preemption discussion as a holding: "The district court held
that, even if Wisconsin treats shrinkwrap licenses as contracts, § 301(a) of the Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), prevents their enforcement." ProCDII, 86 F.3d at 1453.
94. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
95. See id.
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In Feist, Rural Telephone Service Co. was a public utility which
published a conventional phone book containing white pages listings of
its subscribers. 96 Feist sought to publish an area-wide phone book which
would encompass Rural's subscribers as well as those of other utilities.97
Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist and sued Feist for
copyright infringement when a number of its listings were allegedly copied
98
into Feist's area-wide directory.
The Court began its decision by noting that "[Flacts are not
copyrightable... [while] compilations of facts generally are."9 9 Facts are
not copyrightable because they lack the originality which is
constitutionally required before a work may merit copyright protection:
"No one may claim originality as to facts." This is because facts do
not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report
a particular fact has not
1 00 created the fact; he or she has merely
discovered its existence
The Court went on to hold that while a compilation of facts may possess
the requisite originality in the selection and arrangement of the data,
Rural's "garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity," lacked originality and therefore could not
qualify for copyright as a compilation.'
In support of its decision, the Court interpreted the Copyright Act
as embodying a strong policy of "encourag[ing] others to build freely
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work."'0 2 While it may
"seem unfair" that a second-comer could reap the benefits of another's
initial investment in gathering the particular facts, the Court stated that
"[tihis result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which
copyright advances the progress of science and art."0 3
The Court's decision in Feist effectively overturned a long line of
judicial authority, often labeled as "sweat of the brow" cases. 0
Courts
in "sweat of the brow" jurisdictions were willing to afford compilers
copyright protection based on the expenditure of labor inherent -inthe

96. See id.at 342.
97. See id. at 343.
98. See id. at 343-44.
99. Id. at 344. The statutory basis for the Court's statement that facts are not
copyrightable is found in § 102(b) of the Act: "In no case does copyright
protection ...extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). "Section 102(b) is universally
understood to prohibit any copyright in facts." Feist, 499 U.S. at 356.
100. 499 U.S. at 347 (1991) (citation omitted).

101. Id. at 362.
102. Id. at 350 (citation omitted).

103. Id.
104. See id. at 359-60.
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effort to collect and arrange the particular facts. 1' 5 In fact, interestingly,
the Seventh Circuit (which upheld the ProCD contract) has been
described as a "bastion of the 'sweat of the brow theory.""0 6 The Court
in Feist rejected the "sweat of the brow" theory, stating:
In summary, the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt
that originality, not "sweat of the brow," is the touchstone of
copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works.0 7 Nor
is there any doubt that the same was true under the 1909 Act.'
In ProCD, ProCD attempted by private contract to recover the
copyright protection which Feist had clearly withdrawn. The preemption
issue is thus rather sharply defined in ProCD: may a party create, by
contract, copyright-type rights in data which is not afforded copyright
protection under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act? Put
another way, may a party by private contract alter the policy balance
struck by Congress with respect to copyrightable subject matter?
THE DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND
COURT OF APPEALS
Both the district court and court of appeals addressed the question
Section 301(a)
of preemption under § 301(a) of the Copyright Act."0
1.

105. See id. at 352-53 (quoting Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing
Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922)):
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its
preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has
collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such
materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language,
or anything more than industrious collection. The man who goes through the
streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with
their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is
the author.

106. William S. Strong, Database Protection After Feist v. Rural Telephone Co., 42 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 39, 56-57 (1994) ("The Fourth and Seventh Circuits now
reverently cite Feist.... [R]eading their recent opinions one would never know they had
once been bastions of the 'sweat of the brow' theory."); see also Theodore H. Davis, Jr.,

Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80
MINN.L. REV. 595, 630 n.168 (1996):

The Seventh Circuit's adherence to the sweat of the brow doctrine under
the 1909 Act was such that the court in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181
F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) enjoined the defendant from using facts from the
plaintiff's work that were readily available from other sources in the public
domain.
107. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60.
108. Preemption may also be constitutionally based. A particular cause of action may
be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if its enforcement would "stand[ ] as an obstacle
Hines v.
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Hines pre-dated the enactment of the specific
reemption section of the Copyright Act but the constitutional inquiry may still survive.

ee Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Resitutionary

Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 155 n.22 (1992) (stating that the inquiry of whether state law
interferes with congressional intent should survive the enactment of § 301). It is unclear,
however, what the constitutional inquiry would add to § 301. It is reasonable to assume
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provides that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ... and come
within the subject matter of copyright... are governed exclusively by this
title."' 9 The issue which occupied most of the analysis of both courts
was whether the breach of contract claim implicated rights "equivalent"
to any of the exclusive copyright rights. The test for equivalence has often
been stated as whether or not the noncopyright claim contains an "extra
element" which renders it "qualitatively different" from a pure copyright
cause of action; if it does not, then the noncopyright cause of action is
preempted. 110
According to the district court, ProCD's breach of contract claim
was preempted by the Copyright Act. The court stated: "[ProCD's]
breach of contract claim is nothing more than an effort to prevent
defendants from copying and distributing its data, exactly what it sought
to bar defendants from doing under copyright law." 11 ' In other words,
the very act that breached the license agreement infringed the copyright.
The district court rejected the argument that merely because the breach of
element of breach it is
contract claim requires a showing of the additional
11 2
qualitatively different from a copyright claim.
The district court also discussed copyright policy in its preemption
holding. In particular, it characterized the use restriction as "an attempt
to avoid the confines of copyright law and of Feist.""' It found the use
restriction to be fundamentally inconsistent with the copyright policy of
favoring accessibility to information expressed in Feist:
It is only when a contract erects a barrier on access to information
that under copyright law should be accessible that § 301 operates
to protect copyright law from individually crafted evasions of th a t

that both courts would have arrived at the same conclusions they did even under a
constitutional standard since the policy concerns they addressed would have been relevant
in the constitutional inquiry. But see D.C. Toedt III, COUNTERPOINT: Shrinkwrap License
Enforceability Issues, 13COMPUTER L.J. 7, 8-9 (contending that the Seventh Circuit failed to
address Supremacy Clause preemption and setting forth a case for such preemption).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994). Note that both ProCD courts treated the data as falling
within the subject matter of copyright-and thus subject to § 301-despite the fact that the
data lacked the originality required to afford it copyright protection. See ProCD 1, 908 F.
Supp. at 656-57 (reviewing authorities and concluding that § 301 applies to works that "fit
within the general subject matter of §§102 and 103, whether or not the works qualify for
actual protection"); see also ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1453 (ostensibly agreeing with the district
court); infra text accompanying notes 111-12 (noting that in conducting part of its
preemption query, the district court effectively considered whether the act of breach of
contract would constitute copyright infringement if the data had been copyrightable).
110. See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
111. ProCD,908 F.Supp. at 657.
112. Id. at 657-58.
113. Id. at 659.
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Plaintiff cannot use a14standard form contract to make an
law ....
end run around copyright law.
Transaction costs for ProCD itself would have been high if the compilers
used to assemble its
of each of the 3000 directories which ProCD
15
database had included a similar use restriction.
The court of appeals took a much different view of the preemption
question, making much of the distinction between rights established by
law and rights between parties. The court characterized copyright as a
legal right against the world which "restrict[s] the options of persons who
are strangers to the author."1'16 Contracts, on the other hand, "generally
affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do
The court analogized to contracts
not create 'exclusive rights.""' 7
involving trade secrets which often require the recipient of the trade secret
to treat noncopyrightable data as if it were copyrighted." 8 The court
characterized relevant Supreme Court precedent in the trade secret area
as "hold[ing] that contracts about trade secrets may be enforcedprecisely because they do not affect strangers' ability to discover and use
the information independently."" 9
The court of appeals did not expressly use the "extra element" test
to explain why it thought the breach of contract action to be qualitatively
different from a copyright infringement claim. It emphasized, however,
that daily transactions often involve promises involving intellectual
property, and such promises are routinely enforced. 20 For example,
video rental stores often limit the use of the rented tape to home viewing
and require the tape's return in a specified number of days. 121 No one
would suggest that the customer could keep the tape longer because §
301(a) renders the customer's promise unenforceable. 22 In a context
closer to ProCD, the court noted that LEXIS-NEXIS often places use
restrictions on the data it makes available. 23 The court compared the
two, stating:
ProCD offers software and data for two prices: one for personal use,
a higher price for commercial use. Zeidenberg wants to use the data
without paying the seller's price; if the law student [, using LEXIS
under a license priced for educational use only, may not resell to law

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 658.
See id. at 659.
ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1454.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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firms for commercial use,] neither can Zeidenberg [avoid the ProCD
use restriction]. 2

The court stopped short of a per se rule that all contracts would
survive a preemption analysis: "[W]e think it prudent to refrain from
adopting a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily
outside the preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too
numerous to foresee."' 125 The court did attempt to answer the policy
question of how the use restriction could be consistent with the copyright
policy articulated in Feist of maintaining a viable public domain:
"Enforcement of the shrinkwrap license may even make information more
readily available, by reducing the price ProCD charges to consumer
buyers."'1 26 It concluded by stating that "whether a particular license is
generous or restrictive, a simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to
within the general scope of copyright' and
any of the exclusive rights 127
therefore may be enforced."
AN EVALUATION OF THE COMPETING VIEWS
2.
The confusion and inconsistency of preemption law makes
preemption issues notoriously difficult to resolve. Preemption issues
implicate broad policy questions and require courts to articulate the
rationale for a particular legislative enactment and to decide how that
enactment fits within the overall legislative plan and the common law
generally. In part, the reason for the two courts' disparate holdings on
preemption is that the district court concentrated primarily on the
relationship between copyright and contract at an abstract level, while
the court of appeals addressed these two areas from both a theoretical
and practical perspective. In particular, the court of appeals considered
how the preemption decision would impact the market as well as how the
market should influence the preemption decision.
Commentators and courts have never definitively resolved the
question of whether a breach of contract claim in which the act which
constitutes breach is also the act which would infringe the copyright is
preempted. 2 8 However, as a general rule, breach of contract claims are
not preempted by copyright because the additional element of breach of
promise distinguishes the contract claim from one sounding in

124. Id.
125. Id. at 1455.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 519-23 (discussing preemption law and conflicting
judicial authority).
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copyright.' 2 9 The district court rejected precedent to this effect while the
court of appeals characterized it as "sound."' 3 °
Thus, one may infer that the difference between the two courts'
decisions was disagreement over the existence of an "extra element" that
would render the breach of contract action qualitatively different from
copyright and thereby save it from preemption. The district court saw no
such extra element, stating that "[clontracts that seek to protect
reproduction and distribution rights step into the territory already
covered by copyright law." 131 In contrast, one may infer from the court of
appeals' opinion that it found an extra element in the breach of promise.
In the nonnegotiated shrinkwrap context, this promise or consent must be
The court's
inferred by conduct since it is never expressly given.
discussion of market factors supports this reading of its decision. Market
factors may help a court decide whether it is reasonable to assume that a
purchaser either actually assented to the particular terms or would have
assented had it been aware of them. However, the question remains as to
whether such an inquiry is authorized under the Act.
A DEEPER ANALYSIS OF THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
The preemption decision is not as clear cut as either court presented
it. In fact, it is a difficult issue with compelling arguments on both sides.
Because of the importance of its resolution to the computer software
industry, it merits further analysis. Specifically, lawmakers should
identify and weigh competing policy considerations in an effort to form a
consistent rule-even if that rule incorporates flexible standards rather
than articulating a bright-line test. In the meantime, in the absence of
legislative action, courts should continue to consider relevant market
evidence in defining the relationship between copyright and contract in
particular cases.
III.

Two Competing Views of Copyright-Freedom of Contract
v. Public Domain
The particular ProCD issue-defining the allowable range of
contract with respect to noncopyrightable data-brings two extreme
competing views of the purpose of copyright into focus.' 3 2 One view (for
simplicity, referred to as the "freedom of contract" view) contends that
A.

129. See id.
130. ProCD Ii, 86 F.3d at 1454.
131. ProCDI,908 F. Supp. at 658.
132. Prof. I. Trotter Hardy was the first to set forth these competing views in the context
of preemption. See I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright, Contracts, and Preemption in a Digital
World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 9J 37-43 (1995) (noting changes in perception of the meaning
of copyright over the years).
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copyright merely provides a bundle of rights to copyright owners to help
them avoid the transaction costs of contracting with each purchaser of
the copyrighted material.' 3 3 In this model, copyright functions much like
Article 2 of the UCC-as a boilerplate contract to govern the parties'
relationship in the absence of a contrary agreement.1 34 Nothing prevents
the parties from contracting around the rights granted by copyright or, in
the case of data not protected by copyright, from creating their own
property rights through private contract. In the freedom of contract
model, any distinction between the contract and preemption inquiries
collapses. As long as the contract passes muster under traditional
common law contract and the UCC, its provisions--even those affecting
copyright-type rights-are not subject to preemption.
Another view (for simplicity, referred to as the "public domain"
view) argues that copyright represents a legislative scheme carefully
balanced to advance the public interest by providing an incentive to
authors to create while safeguarding the free flow of the information on
which such creativity is based. 35 In this model, there are immutable rules

133. See id. at T 37 (arguing that the original intent of the Framers was that copyright
would be like any other property right and thereby include the owner's right to transact as
he saw fit).
38 ("[T]he traditional, property view sees the copyright statute as
134. Cf. id. at
simply providing a backdrop for individual bargains and negotiations over licenses.").
135. Court cases and the literature present ample statements to this effect. See, e.g., Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress
of Science anduseful Arts.' . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,cS. 8) (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985)); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 & n.10 (1984) (citing legislative history from
the 1909 Act to the effect that copyright law is to advance public welfare and stating:
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate
access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the
other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended
repeatedly.);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the
limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest- Creative work is to be encouraged
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.
(footnotes omitted)); see also Jessica Litman, Innovation and the Information Environment:
Revisitin$ Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 46 (1996) (arguing that
"[clopynght owners have no legitimate claim to fence off the public domain material that
they ave incorporated in their copyrighted works from the public from whom they
borrowed it," and promoting the merits of a system that explicitly recognizes the public
interest in public domain material); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965,
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around which the parties cannot contract because the public interest
The
cannot be sacrificed on the altar of two-party agreements. 136
problem is in defining exactly which provisions of the copyright law are
immutable and which are not, in a manner more definitive than simply
stating "We know immutable rules when we see them."' 3 7 The public
domain model thus distinguishes between the contract and preemption
inquiries. Merely because a contract is enforceable under traditional
contract law does not mean that it is not preempted by copyright law.
The difficulty lies in identifying under what circumstances provisions of
an otherwise enforceable contract are preempted.
An Evaluation of the Competing Views
The freedom of contract view has some intuitive appeal. The
copyright system itself is primarily based on an economic rationale:
The
correcting defects inherent in the market for public goods.'3 8
motivating factor behind the pre-Feist sweat of the brow holdings 139 was
in some sense market failure. The compiler of facts could invest a
substantial sum in the discovery and collation of facts. Copyright
provided a ready mechanism to allow the factual compiler to recoup its
investment.
After Feist, the withdrawal of copyright protection for factual
compilations resulted in a market defect in that compilers could no longer
To counteract that market imperfection,
recoup their investments.
compilers began to enter into contracts privately, to establish the
copyright protection that the public law had withdrawn. Adherents of
the freedom of contract view would argue that, since copyright itself is a
response to market imperfections, it should be permissible to use private
contract to overcome a market imperfection caused by the withdrawal of
that copyright protection.
B.

967 (1990) ("[T]he public domain is the law's primary safeguard of the raw material that
makes authorship possible.").
136. See Hardy, supra note 132, at 1 38 ("[Tlhe modem view sees the statute as
specifying what are essentially the actual quite specific terms of large classes of 'bargains'
over the use of intellectual property.").
137. See id. at U 44 (contending that wholesale adoption of the modem view of
copyriht would imply "a more aggressive interpretation of copyright's preemption
clause ').
138. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE AcrIvrry: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 612-15 (National Bureau of Economic Research eds., 1962); ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 108 (1988) (defining a public good as one "for
which there is no rivalry in consumption"). For a general economic perspective on
copyright law, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
139. For an explanation of the "sweat of the brow theory," see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
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The supporters of the public domain model would respond in two
From an
ways, with both economic and non-economic arguments.
requiring
goods
are
public
facts
that
economic perspective, while it is true
some incentive mechanism to encourage their discovery, facts also
If copyright
constitute the building blocks for further creativity.
protection extended to facts, some creative expression would be foregone.
Second-comers would be unable to build on those facts without incurring
the transaction costs of locating the copyright owner, negotiating with her
and paying her a license fee. From a systemic perspective, then, the
refusal to protect facts may be economically justified because protection
may result in a decrease rather than increase in creative activity. To
allow parties to contract otherwise would frustrate the carefully crafted
balance which Congress has constructed.
Noneconomic justifications may also be offered for refusing to
enforce use restrictions applicable to facts. The decision to withhold
copyright protection from facts is based, in part, on the belief that they
should be free for all, irrespective of whether protection would encourage
or discourage creativity at the end of the day. Individual parties should
not be free to create barriers to this information which Congress has
deemed should be readily accessible. Another way to put it is that
copyright law is based on other policy considerations in addition to
economics. Therefore, any particular contract which is enforceable under,
for example, Article 2 of the UCC, may still be subject to preemption if,
under the particular circumstances, other policies trump those of freedom
of contract.
The concerns of the public domain theory are particularly evident in
the shrinkwrap context. Because the forms are both standard in content
and pervasive, they resemble private copyright law. A state clearly could
not enact a valid statute which extended copyright protection to facts,
yet by enforcing ProCD type provisions in its courts, the state effectively
achieves the same result. The rights set up by the shrinkwrap thus begin
to resemble copyright rights against the world rather than mere
contractual rights between two parties.
Moreover, a long-standing doctrine of intellectual property law
states that the purchaser of a product is free to do with it as he wishes,
except for engaging in acts which would violate intellectual property
rights.1 40 For example, no one would suggest enforcing a boilerplate

140. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (codifying the "first-sale" doctrine, which
provides that the purchaser of a copyrighted work is free to do with it as he or she pleases
subject only to the copyright owner's § 106 exclusive rights). However, note that the firstsale doctrine is limited in the case of software. While other purchasers are free to dispose
of other copyrighted works as they see fit, since the Computer Software Rental Amendments
09 prohibits "any person in possession of a particular copy of a computer
Act of 1990,§W
program... [from,] for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, dispos[ing]
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contract for a new car that provided for breach if the car were used on
the Massachusetts Turnpike or a label on a Coke can that prohibited
reverse engineering. More to the point, it seems likely that if the
conventional phone book were distributed with a tear-off strip containing
a clause that attempted to limit the recipient's use of the book, such a
clause would not be enforced. Why then can't the purchaser of the
factual database use and dispose of the facts it just bought in the same
way that the car purchaser can drive the car on the Massachusetts
Turnpike, the Coke purchaser may reverse engineer the soda, and the
recipient of the hard copy phone book may do with it as he pleases?
This illustration encapsulates the essence of the public domain
argument-enforcement of the shrinkwrap use restriction frustrates
fundamental intellectual property doctrine.
C.

Alternative Approaches
The optimal position on the spectrum running from the freedom of
contract model to the public domain model probably lies somewhere in
between the two. To reach this position, courts must descend from the
realm of the purely theoretical to decide concrete cases and reconcile
competing interests. In so doing, they must use a decision-making model
that integrates considerations such as economic and other public policy
concerns. The following discusses the decision-making models that courts
could use in deciding whether to enforce contractual terms which restrict
the copyright rights that purchasers would otherwise have.
1.

THE EASTERBROOK APPROACH

Obviously, one model is that which Judge Easterbrook employed.
Under this model, contractual terms are generally not preempted since
they affect only their parties and do not create rights against the world in
the same manner that the public copyright law does. Thus, there would
be little reason to preempt provisions of contracts modifying copyright
rights where those contracts are entered into by two knowledgeable,
informed parties.1 4 1 Such a freely bargained contract would, as Judge

of, or authoriz[ing] the disposal of, the possession of that... computer program... by
rental, lease or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994); see also Thomas M. S. Hemnes,
Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software
Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994) (comparing the development of software licensing
to the feudal system of land tenure and arguing that the law on restraints on alienation and
real estate law on equitable servitudes may assist courts in determining what covenants
should run with the software). Note also that the textual proposition seems to undercut
Easterbrook's argument that the purchaser should expect the use restriction given the price
it pays. See supra section II.A.2. The user's expectations with respect to the rights it
obtains for a particular price are based not only on contract but also on longstanding
copyright principles; which include the right to use facts.
141. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 523-28.
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Easterbrook said, "generally affect only its parties" 142 and would not set
up by private contract a copyright scheme that competes with federal
law.
Standard form contracts are more troublesome because they come
Yet
closer to establishing a competitive private copyright, scheme.
but
may
of
themselves,
in
and
standard form contracts are not invidious
simply be a mechanism enabling a mass market to evolve where otherwise
one might not exist. Under the Easterbrook model, a court assessing
restrictive terms contained in a standard form contract should analyze
relevant market factors as Judge Easterbrook did in ProCD.14 3 If the
restriction is reasonable under the circumstances, the court should infer
the purchaser's consent. This consent would provide the "extra element"
which would save the agreement from preemption under § 301. As Judge
Easterbrook said, paraphrasing the Supreme Court:
Terms and conditions offered by contract reflect private ordering,
essential to the efficient functioning of markets. Although some
principles that carry the name of contract law are designed to
defeat rather than implement consensual transactions ... the rules
that respect private choice are not preempted by a clause [such as §
301 which is aimed at] prevent[ing the] states from substituting
their own 1 44regulatory systems for those of the national
government.
Under the Easterbrook model, where the particular term modifying
copyright rights is reasonable, it is not preempted even if it is not
bargained for and even if the party whom that term is to bind is unaware
of its existence.
Presumably, if a party could demonstrate that a market is not
functioning efficiently, a court could make a deeper inquiry into
enforceability. Judge Easterbrook left the nature and extent of that
inquiry unspecified. However, one may infer that it would focus on the
flexible doctrine of unconscionability. 145 If a party could show that a
market were inefficient, under the Easterbrook model, a court might set
aside a contract or particular terms thereof as unconscionable.
The Easterbrook model embodies the freedom of contract approach
to copyright by collapsing the contract and preemption issues. Courts
should, however, recognize the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of

142. ProCDII, 86 F.3d at 1454.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 33-57 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's use of
economic considerations in upholding the shrinkwrap); text accompanying notes 123-27
(discussing the economic factors influencing the Seventh Circuit's preemption holding).
144. ProCD 11, 86 F.3d at 1455 (citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817,
824-25 (1995)).
145. See supra text accompanying note 57 (noting that Easterbrook contends that
shrinkwraps are enforceable unless they fail some contractual test such as
unconscionability).
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contract and copyright are different. A more nuanced approach that
takes this difference into account might therefore be preferable.
2.

THE "DEFAULT RULES" APPROACH

Another decision-making model that a court might use in assessing
use restrictions is one based on an analogy to the models described in the
default rules literature.'4 6 This literature classifies rules as either default
or immutable. 1 47 Parties are free to contract around default rules but
cannot vary immutable ones.' 48 Historically, the default rules literature
has primarily been concerned with filling contractual gaps.1 49 However, it
could also be used to help address the issue of whether the norm for
contractual provisions which purport to restrict copyright rights should
be one of enforcement or nonenforcement.
An adherent of the public domain view would contend that the
Act's refusal to provide protection for facts is an immutable rule.
Generally, immutable rules may be justified when "unregulated
contracting would be socially deleterious because parties internal or
In
external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves."'
other words, either paternalism or externalities can be used to justify
classifying a particular rule as immutable.' 5 '
Neither of these two considerations offers a convincing case for
branding the Act's rule against protection for facts immutable. Parties
who agree to contracts which restrict copyright rights are usually
protected in some manner. When parties are informed, they are protected
by their own knowledge. When they are uninformed, they are protected
by the impersonal workings of the market; the market helps to ensure that
the provisions of even standard form contracts are reasonable.
Paternalism, then, does not support labeling lack of protection for facts
an immutable rule.
The externality argument for an immutable rule is somewhat
stronger. Since facts constitute the building blocks for creative activity,
restrictions on the use of facts (particularly if they become pervasive)
could substantially increase costs. Any benefit from a use restriction

146. This literature is extensive. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default
Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 823-24 & nn.10-19 (citing default rules
literature).

147. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 87 (1989) ("The legal rules of contract
and corporations can be divided into two distinct classes. The larger class consists of
'default rules ... while the smaller class consists of 'immutable' rules.').
148. See id.

149. See generally id.
150. Id. at88.
151. See id.
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would be offset by the costs of expression foregone. Unfortunately, this
argument is inherently speculative. Virtually all contractual terms impose
costs on someone or something. If this were the only criterion for making
a rule immutable, then it would be a short trip down the slope to making
all contract rules unchangeable. This result is not desirable generally or in
this case. In the absence of empirical evidence on the impact of use
restrictions which demonstrates that their costs exceed their benefits,
labeling the copyright rule immutable seems unwise without evidence of
congressional intent to that effect.
If the Act's rule against protecting facts is not immutable, then the
issue devolves to the question of whether the default rule should be one
which enforces use restrictions or not. At first glance, the default rules
literature seems to argue for the Easterbrook approach. The conventional
theory is that the default rule should be set at what the parties would
have agreed to had they negotiated over the particular issue." 2 Evidence
of usage of trade and considerations of economic efficiency help a court
to decide what rule the parties would have agreed to had they
bargained.1 5 3 In this context, the conventional theory would argue for a
default rule of enforcement. Usage of trade and economic efficiency both
support the proposition that the parties would have agreed to the use
Therefore, while standard form
restriction had they bargained over it.'
agreements may resemble private legislation, their terms in fact mirror
what the parties would have agreed to in a negotiation and therefore
should be enforced.
However, another principle revealed in the default rules literature is
that the default should be drawn against the relatively informed party to
In the ProCD
give that party an incentive to reveal information.15 5
context, this test may argue for a default rule of nonenforcement of use
restrictions. The ordinary consumer purchaser of software is likely to be
uninformed about the relevant law. To the extent that such purchaser is

152. See SCHWARTZ & ScoTT, supra note 64, at 21, 23 (stating the textual proposition
and contending that such a choice of default rule is desirable because it saves negotiation
costs); Cf.Ayres & Gertner, supra note 147, at 89 (stating that "[flew academics have gone
beyond one-sentence theories stipulating that default terms should have been set at what
the parties would have wanted" and going on to question whether the "would have
wanted" theory should always apply in setting default rules).
153. See Barnett, supra note 146, at 906-07 (identifying express terms, course of dealing
and usage of trade as important sources to aid in understanding the parties' intent).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56 (setting forth the economic rationale of
the Seventh Circuit in upholding the shrinkwrap); notes 78-83 (arguing that usage of trade
supports both the manner of contracting and the particular terms).
155. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 147, at 91 (calling such default rules "penalty
defaults" and stating "[i]n contrast to the received wisdom, penalty defaults are
purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to
reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts)"); see also
Barnett, supra note 146, at 888-89 (using a consent theory to explain penalty defaults).
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informed, its expectations are likely to be set by reference to the bargain
struck by the Copyright Act'1 6 -a bargain which permits the free use of
facts."5 7 If purchasers expect copyright to apply to the data they
purchase and fail to notice the use restriction, they may pay too much for
the product. A penalty default of nonenforcement would correct this
market imperfection of asymmetric information by encouraging sellers to
disclose information. The use restriction would generally be enforceable if
the seller brought it to the purchaser's attention. In a negotiated contract,
the seller would expressly bring the desired term to the buyer's attention
in the course of writing it into the contract. In the case of the standard
form contract, the seller could not expressly make the buyer aware of the
use restriction but could put the buyer on notice of it by making the term
conspicuous. The default rules model, then, would support a rule of
nonenforcement unless the use restriction were conspicuous.
3.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFAULT RULES MODEL

There is an objection to this suggestion of a nonenforceability norm,
which Judge Easterbrook noted in assessing the use restriction's
enforceability. In rejecting the argument that the license or its terms
should have been conspicuous, he stated, "Competition among vendors,
not judicial revision of a package's contents, is how consumers are
protected in a market economy. 1 5 8 In other words, in an efficient
market, there is no reason to require conspicuousness as a legal rule. The
terms which the seller offers are desirable from both the buyer's and
seller's perspective, regardless of whether or not the buyer notices a
particular term. The product price adjusts in light of the package of
terms offered even where the buyer is uninformed.
Moreover, under certain conditions, the market itself will move
sellers to make certain terms conspicuous. For example, sellers often
bring warranties to the buyer's attention as a way to differentiate their
products.1 9 In the ProCD case, ProCD had an incentive to make the use
restriction obvious. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the use restriction was
the primary means through which ProCD put its price discrimination

156. The Copyright Act, in one form or another, has been with us since 1790. Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect that purchasers have some sense of what it is. Major revisions to
the Act were enacted in 1831, 1870, 1909 and 1976. See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY,
LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2-15 (6th ed. 1986) (outlining the history of the Copyright
Act).
. 157. See supra note 99 (setting forth the statutory basis for the free use of facts).
Admittedly, Fezst was decided relatively recently, in 1991. However, the Court emphasized
that its statement that facts are not copyrightable has been the law at least since 1909. See
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355-56 (1991).
158. ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1453.
159. See SCHWARTZ & Scorr, supra note 64, at 106 (explaining the signaling function of
warranties).
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strategy into effect. 160 ProCD therefore had an interest in making sure the
purchaser understood that restriction. Of course, ProCD could always
seek to enforce the restriction judicially after breach by a purchaser; hence
the suit against Zeidenberg. However, litigation is expensive and
damages are not always compensatory. Moreover, the damage may be
irreparable. Electronic information is much easier to copy and make
broadly available than hard copy publications. A user can upload data
to the Internet and make it accessible to millions of users in just a few
keystrokes, substantially decreasing the size of the information
originator's market. 61 ProCD therefore had a strong incentive to inform
162
purchasers of its CD-ROM that such activity would not be tolerated.
If the market functions to encourage the seller to disclose information then
a legal rule with the same end seems at best superfluous.
These objections to a default rule of nonenforcement reflect different
assumptions about the market. The default rules approach makes the
most sense when the market is inefficient, while the Easterbrook
approach is most suitable for an efficiently functioning market. Markets
fall into both categories, but legal rules are usually cast in general terms.
Thus, a default rule of nonenforcement might be preferable because it
protects purchasers in inefficient markets while not materially raising
costs or otherwise interfering with the operation of an efficient market.
The overall impact on litigation costs under the alternative rules is
speculative. A default rule requiring a use restriction to be conspicuous
could be cheaper because sellers who failed to comply with it would not
survive a summary judgment motion; otherwise, both models would
require some evidence regarding market condition. The Easterbrook
model would enforce the terms in an efficient market and make a deeper
market inquiry in deciding whether a particular term is unconscionable in
the case of an inefficient market. The default rules model would also still
consider market factors. Making the term conspicuous would not provide
a safe harbor--other contractual doctrines such as unconscionability
would continue to apply. The two tests might therefore often arrive at
63
the same results.

160. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56 (explaining why ProCD adopted a price
discrimination scheme and how it worked).
161. Zeidenberg's database containing ProCD's listings "was receiving approximately
20,000 'hits' per day on the Internet." ProCDI, 908 F. Supp. at 646. The effect on ProCD s
market was unspecified.
162. How conspicuous ProCD made the use restriction is not clear. However, the
license agreement was printed in a number of places in the package and appeared on the
screen each time the user loaded the software. gee supra text accompanying note 17.
163. One obvious difference between the two would be in the case of the
nonconspicuous use restriction employed in an efficient market. The Easterbrook model
would enforce it while the default rules model would not since it fails to comply with the
mandatory requirement of conspicuousness.
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However, other policy reasons may favor adopting the default rules
analysis. Even if the market were efficient, it may be appropriate to put
purchasers on notice of the fact that the copyright rights they are
accustomed to in the hard copy world are being modified in the soft copy
one. The default rules approach would further the Code philosophy of
encouraging efficient contracting while also recognizing the copyright
policy favoring the free use of facts. Under the default rules model,
purchasers would be less likely inadvertently to surrender the rights they
have under copyright law since their relinquishing such rights would be
brought to their attention. This notice would help to make the private
legislation of the shrinkwrap more closely resemble a true negotiated
agreement in which parties have agreed to restrict their copyright rights in
exchange for the product they purchased.
The default rules approach thus offers a flexible model for courts to
use. At the outset, a court could consider whether the particular
copyright rule around which the parties are contracting is immutable or
not. If it is not, courts may still consider copyright policy in determining
under what conditions the terms which vary the social bargain struck by
the Copyright Act should be enforced.
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY FOR ADOPTING A DECISIONMAKING MODEL
Both the Easterbrook and default rules models have difficulties.
Relevant market evidence would have to be introduced under both, as
well as evidence of congressional intent under the default rules model.
More troubling, however, is the issue of whether either a market or a
detailed policy inquiry is an appropriate one for the judiciary to make.
Normally, the balancing of competing interests is a matter for the
legislature to consider when drafting a statute. The legislature has the
institutional competence to weigh competing viewpoints and arrive at a
conclusion. The unelected judiciary largely lacks such institutional
competence.
Moreover, § 301 by its literal terms does not authorize a detailed
market analysis. 1" Its inquiry is rather mechanical. However, in cases
like breach of contract where the "extra element" is breach of promise, the
market analysis cannot be avoided in the context of nonnegotiated
agreements. The promise is not express, yet it may in fact be perfectly
reasonable to infer it. Thus, unless § 301 is interpreted to allow market
evidence as an aid in determining whether a real promise exists, the
4.

164. Note, however, that market analysis would likely be admissible in evaluating
See supra note 108
constitutional preemption if such preemption survives § 301.
(considering whether constitutional preemption survives).
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provisions of most standard form agreements affecting copyright-type
rights would be preempted. This result does not seem to be desirable in
light of congressional silence on the topic.
In reality, courts have for years been conducting market analysis in
copyright cases, suggesting that they do have the institutional competence
to balance competing interests in cases like ProCD. In particular, courts
historically have examined market evidence in assessing alleged infringers'
claims of fair use under § 107 of the Act. Fair use is an equitable defense
to an infringement claim, allowing a court to use public policy grounds to
excuse conduct that would otherwise be infringing. 6 ' In conducting a fair
use inquiry, a court is to balance the four non-exclusive statutory fair use
factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) fthe amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential
166
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Although the Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity of weighing all
four factors in light of the Act's statutory purpose before making a fair
68
use determination,167 courts have emphasized the first and the fourth.1
For example, a fair-use-type inquiry would ask whether the ProCD
use restriction was reasonable in light of the market for fact-based
databases. It would also ask if Zeidenberg's conduct were to become
widespread, what impact would that have on the database market and
the incentives of others to create similar works? These are exactly the
types of considerations which the Seventh Circuit emphasized. The
Seventh Circuit's decision in ProCD could be viewed as almost a
"reverse" fair use inquiry.1 69 Rather than using market factors to assess
whether an infringer's conduct should be excused, the Seventh Circuit
used market factors to determine whether a copyright owner's use of

165. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 13.05, 13-152 to 13-157; see also 1.7U.S.C.
§ 107 (1994) (listing "purposes such as criticism, comment news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research...' as nonexclusive
examples of the types of uses which may be privileged as Fair).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
167. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (citing Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207 (1990)).
168. See Roxana Badin, Note, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value:
Appropriation Art's Exclusion From Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV.
1653, 1678-79 (1995) (stating that the Court weighs the first and fourth factors heavily in
its fair use determination").
169. I am indebted to Prof. Hardy for suggesting that importing some or all of the fair use
factors into a preemption inquiry may be appropriate. Letter from I. Trotter Hardy,
Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law to Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Assoc. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, November 25, 1996 (on file
with the author). Any errors in the analysis are, of course, my own.
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contract to buttress its copyright rights-or lack thereof as in ProCDwould constitute "fair use" under the Act and therefore survive
preemption. Its analysis, rather than being revolutionary, seems fully
justified given that § 301 must authorize a market inquiry or else many
standard form contracts would be preempted. Moreover, the already
existing § 107 market inquiry forms a principled basis from which the
court could conduct its analysis. In other words, the Seventh Circuit, in
balancing competing interests, was not exceeding its institutional
competence but rather using the flexible approach already implicitly
authorized in the statutory structure of the Copyright Act.
The default rules approach is more difficult to support under
current statutory wording. There is scant authority in either § 301 or the
UCC for a court to impose a requirement of conspicuousness on the
parties. A court might seek to do so under the general requirement that
"[e]very contract or duty within [the UCCI imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." 7 0
There are, however, difficulties with this approach. Courts are split
on the issue of whether a mere allegation of lack of good faith, without
more, may state a cause of action under the UCC. 71 Second, using good
faith to imply such a requirement seems fundamentally at odds with a
vision of the Code as a comprehensive statement of the law. If courts
may use good faith to imply new contractual duties, the certainty and
concomitant cost reduction which the Code was designed to achieve may
be seriously compromised. Moreover, it would be unfair to impose a new
requirement on an unsuspecting seller, at least in the first instance.
Thus, implementation of the default rules approach may require an
amendment to the UCC to make the conspicuousness requirement
express. This amendment could be easily incorporated into the proposed

170. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1996). Of course, a court might also imply a requirement of
conspicuousness under § 2-302 on unconscionability or as a matter of statutory
interpretation. See e.g., Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wis. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20
(1975) (suggesting a limitation of remedy clause could be unconscionable if it were
inconspicuous); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N. J. Super. 383, 268
A.2d 345 (1970) (reading into the UCC a requirement that an "as is" disclaimer be
conspicuous to be enforceable despite the lack ofstatutory language to that effect). Neither
of these approaches is likely to be availing in the case of use restrictions. As argued
earlier, they are generally not unconscionable, see supra notes 87-91 and accompanying
text (discussing unconscionability). Also, there is no section in the UCC on use restrictions
that would provide a basis from which a court could read in a conspicuousness
requirement.
171. See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-203:01, n. 1
(1995) (collecting cases on both sides of the issue); see also Fred H. Miller, The Obligation of
Good Faith and the New PEB Commentary, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 54, 54 (1994)
(reviewing issues associated with good faith and noting that the Permanent Editorial
Board of the UCC issued a commentary indicating that "UCC section 1-203 does not create
an independent cause of action because one cannot simply act in good faith; one acts in good
faith relative to the agreement of the parties.").
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Article 2B which addresses licensing. 17 2 In the meantime, however, the
Easterbrook model, while perhaps not ideal, does provide room for
protecting purchasers against unreasonable use restrictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Electronic technology is different from the hard copy publications
for which copyright law was designed. The sheer volume of academic
commentary debating the merits of applying the existing copyright regime
or devising some new form of protection for electronic works is testimony
to the difficulties of adapting the law to deal with technology which did
not exist at the time the law was enacted.17 3 Where a genuinely new
technology emerges, it may be appropriate to defer to the market in the
absence of specific congressional intent to the contrary. Congress first
comprehensively considered the impact of new technology on the
copyright laws in 1979.174 In computer science, 18 years is an eternity,
encompassing a number of hardware and software generations. The
technology and its uses have changed a great deal since 1979. It seems
appropriate therefore for a court to consider the nature of the subject
matter and how the market for that subject matter works, rather than
blindly applying copyright principles that may no longer fit.
In fact, Congress has attempted to "catch up" with the technology.
1 75
The recent report of the National Information Infrastructure Task Force
and flurry of legislative proposals176-including one to extend a new form
of protection to on-line databases177-- demonstrate that at least some
members of Congress believe that adjustments should be made to the
Copyright Act to clarify the manner in which its rules should be applied
to electronic technology. Prior to congressional action, allowing parties to
structure their deals as they see fit, within the confines of traditional
contract law, seems reasonable. 7 8

172. See supra note 67 (discussing the Article 2B effort).
173. See Litman, Revisiting Copyright, supra note 135; Pamela Samuelson et al., A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal-Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308,
2310-11, nn.1 & 5 (1994) (listing some of the extensive literature regarding the appropriate
level of protection for computer software and also contributing to it).
174. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS

175.

(1979).

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995).

THE

176. See, e.g., H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996) (proposed National Information
Infrastructure (Nil) Copyright Protection Act).
177. See H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing a new form of legal
protection for databases to safegar the investment made in creating the database against
exploitation by others); Bill, Treaty Proposal Would Create New Protection of Databases, 52
PAT. TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHTJ. 141 (1996) (summarizing the proposal and citing Feist as
creating interest in adopting a new form of database protection).
178. In fact, in introducing the database legislation, Rep. Moorhead seemed to assume
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Moreover, allowing parties to enter into contracts is not
synonymous with granting them a license to enforce all the terms of such
contracts, no matter how onerous or how much at odds with public
policy they may be. The governing law, be it common law contract or the
UCC, has never been one of unfettered freedom of contract. The same
limits that have always applied continue to apply to contracts involving
electronic data. Additionally, even in making a market inquiry, the courts
should be willing to look outside of contract doctrine-for example, to the
antitrust laws-in making the determination as to whether or not a
thereof should be enforced given a particular
particular agreement or term
79
1
market and its defects.

Certainly, both the Easterbrook and default rules approaches lean
much more toward the freedom of contract model than to the public
domain model of copyright law. This seems appropriate for the reasons
set forth above, but it also highlights the need for systematic treatment of
the issue of how to define the contract/copyright boundary. In continuing
to address legislative proposals dealing with electronic technologies,
Congress should consider this question thoughtfully and perhaps offer
more guidance to the judiciary than the current § 301. In particular,
Congress should clarify its intent with respect to which copyright rules
are immutable and which are subject to change by private agreement,
either by amending the Copyright Act or by enacting new legislation to
address electronic technology. In the absence of that clarification, courts
should continue to inform their decisions with reference to market
considerations and by analogy to other areas of law. This flexible inquiry
seems consistent with the Copyright Act's overall approach and well
within judicial expertise.

that contract was a viable option for database owners, stating that state contract law
remains an "essential tool" for protecting databases. Bill, Treaty Proposal Would Create
New Protection of Databases, supra note 177, at 141.
179. See, e.g., O'Rourke supra note 5, at 551 (contending that while decompilation
provisions in software license agreements should generally be enforced, such provisions
should be preempted when the licensor has market power sufficient to allow it to engage in
exclusionary practices or to leverage its power into another market).

